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Abstract 
This paper argues that several sorts of metaphysical and semantic 
indeterminacy afflict the causal relation. If, as it is plausible to hold, there is a 
relationship between causation and moral responsibility, then indeterminacy 
in the causal relation results in indeterminacy of moral responsibility more 
generally. 
 
1. Introduction 
Vagueness and indeterminacy are thought to infect many of our most important 
metaphysical tools—existence, composition, persistence, parthood, essence, and identity, 
to name a few. More recently, vagueness and indeterminacy have been thought to infect 
our moral properties and predicates as well: terms like “is permissible”, for example, are 
thought to be vulnerable to vagueness and indeterminacy.1 Here I uncover several new 
forms of indeterminacy in the causal relation. First, I will argue that causation is 
indeterminate in certain important cases of causation by omission. Second, I will show 
that it is indeterminate which causal concept to employ in many cases of moral evaluation 
regarding agents’ causal contributions to outcomes. If, as it is plausible to hold, there is a 
relationship between causation and moral responsibility, then the sorts of indeterminacy 
that afflict the causal relation have serious consequences for the metaphysics of moral 
responsibility.  
 I will make several assumptions in my discussion. First, I will assume that there is 
a relationship between causation and moral responsibility. I will not specify the exact 
nature of it or of moral responsibility more generally, but the idea will be that one is 
generally morally responsible for what one causes. I do not take causation to be sufficient 
for moral responsibility, but I do take causation to be centrally important to moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  One recent argument to this effect comes from Miriam Schoenfield in her “Moral Vagueness is Ontic 
Vagueness” (2015) Ethics 126 (2): 257-282. She argues that if moral realism is true, the predicate “is 
permissible” is vague. 
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assessment. For example, I take it that the assassin’s actually shooting and killing Victim, 
rather than merely intending to shoot Victim (or shooting and missing Victim), is 
important for the moral assessment of the assassin’s actions. Here I set aside intentions, 
promises, moral obligations, knowledge of likely outcomes, and other normative features 
of such cases that would normally be considered relevant. The major focus of my 
discussion will be the type of causal responsibility that is relevant to moral responsibility, 
however much causation matters to moral responsibility in comparison to other 
normative elements.2 
 Second, I hold that omissions—roughly, the non-occurrence of positive events—
can be causes, as when a failure to repair the pipe causes the building to leak; effects, as 
when the building leak causes the meeting’s cancellation; and causal intermediaries, as 
when the same meeting’s cancellation causes the committee to be reconstituted. Whether 
or not omissions are causal is controversial. Some deny that omissions can be causes at 
all.3 Others hold that omissions can serve as causal explanations, but are not, in fact, 
causal.4 I hold that omissions are causal in the ways that matter insofar as they play 
comparable predictive, explanatory, and moral roles as normal “positive” events.5  
 
2. Metaphysical Indeterminacy of Effects and Causes 
In this section I will argue that the relata of causation can be metaphysically 
indeterminate.  I say “can” because I do not think that they are always indeterminate. 
Rather, certain special cases of causation by omission and action exhibit indeterminacy, 
and thus there is indeterminacy in the causal relation more generally. There are cases in 
which it is indeterminate exactly which particular effect within a range of effects is 
brought about. There are also cases in which it is indeterminate exactly which cause 
within a range of causes brings about a particular effect. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I will remain as neutral as possible on what moral responsibility is, though it will be helpful to assume 
that moral responsibility is moral blameworthiness or praiseworthiness. 3	  For example, Phil Dowe in Physical Causation (2000) New York: Cambridge University Press. 4	  Helen Beebee is a prominent proponent of this view. See her ‘Causing and Nothingness’ in: Causation 
and Counterfactuals (2004) Ed. by John Collins, Ned Hall, and L. A. Paul. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 
291–308. 5	  I give fuller arguments for this conclusion in Bernstein “Omission Impossible” Philosophical Studies 
(forthcoming) and  “Omissions as Possibilities” (2014) Philosophical Studies 167 1-23. 	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 To begin, consider the following example, taken from Sartorio’s (2006) “Failures 
to Act and Failures of Additivity”: 
 Battlefield: Jane is at the battlefield and sees that four of her soldiers are about to 
 be slaughtered by the enemy. She could save any one of them, but only one of 
 them. (She only has one bullet left, and each one of her soldiers is being attacked 
 by one enemy soldier). She cannot get herself to choose which one to save so they 
 all die.6 
 
First question: for what is Jane causally responsible?  
 It is implausible to hold Jane causally responsible for all four soldiers’ deaths, 
since she could have, at most, saved only one of them. And it is implausible to hold that 
Jane was responsible for any particular soldier’s death, since there are no grounds for 
holding that she failed to save that soldier over the others. Moreover, it seems wrong that 
Jane was responsible for none of the soldiers’ deaths, since she could have saved one of 
them. What is a good diagnosis of the causal structure of this case? 
 Sartorio suggests that Jane is responsible for each soldier’s death, but not  
all soldiers’ deaths. She holds that Battlefield constitutes a counterexample to the 
additivity of causation. According to additivity, if c is a cause of some effects, c is also a 
cause of their sum. There are two readings of these cases: “c caused e1 and e2 and e3” 
versus “c caused their sum”. The former can be true while the latter isn’t, thus avoiding 
the conclusion that Jane is responsible for the sum of the soldiers’ deaths. 
          But accepting that Jane is a cause of each soldier’s death while denying additivity 
has several undesirable consequences. First, the causal verdict seems to deliver an 
incorrect moral verdict. The result lies in tension with the principle that ought implies 
can, since Jane could not have saved each of the lives, and so should not be held 
responsible for each death. It seems incorrect to say, of any particular soldier, that Jane is 
morally responsible for that soldier’s death. Moreover, the consequences of this view 
become less plausible as the number of relata increases, as illustrated by the following 
case: 
  
Road Safety Czar: A road safety czar takes the day off. He was supposed to   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This example is drawn and slightly modified from Carolina Sartorio’s “Failures to Act and Failures of 
Additivity” (2006) Philosophical Perspectives, pp. 373– 385, which uses the example for a different 
purpose. 
	   4	  
check one freeway that day; there are one hundred freeways to check. Suppose 
that a fatal accident happens on each freeway that was not checked, and each 
accident is due in some way to bad road conditions that could have been 
prevented had the Safety Czar done his job.  
 
According to Sartorio’s view, the Safety Czar is responsible for each of 100 fatal 
accidents, but not all of the accidents. But, even with a denial of additivity of causation, 
this is an undesirable and counterintuitive result.  
 Another solution is to hold that such cases are evidence for disjunctive effects. In 
a causal claim, disjunctive effects take the form “C caused either e1 or e2 or e3 to occur.” 
Thus Jane caused either soldier 1 or soldier 2 or soldier 3’s death, but not all the soldiers’ 
deaths.7 Ballarin argues for this interpretation of Sartorio’s case, holding that Jane caused 
one of the soldiers to die, but no particular soldier is such that Jane caused her death.8 
 But there are several reasons to reject disjunctivity of effects. First: supposing that 
the causal relata are spatiotemporally located events, it is unclear how disjunctive events 
could have specific spacetime locations. Second: there are no principled restrictions on 
how many disjunctions there are. Consider that, in addition to bringing about the 
disjunctive outcome involving the soldiers, Jane’s failing to shoot the gun also brought 
about several other disjunctive outcomes: Soldier 1’s death OR the destruction of the 
Eiffel Tower, for example. Disjunctive effects open a theory of causation to the inclusion 
of intuitively irrelevant causal relata. Profligate disjunctive effects are a high theoretical 
cost. Third, accepting disjunctive effects makes one vulnerable to accepting that causes, 
as well as effects, can be disjunctive. Consider a case in which any one of multiple 
soldiers could shoot any one of many enemy soldiers, but none do. Here, there is a 
temptation to diagnose the cause as well as the effect as disjunctive. Accepting 
disjunctivity of causes and effects only seems to amplify the problems mentioned. But 
denying disjunctivity of causes while accepting disjunctivity of effects is a commitment 
to an unexplained asymmetry between causes and effects. Disjunctivity of causal relata is 
to be avoided, if possible. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  In “Disjunctive Causes” Journal of Philosophy (2006) 103 (10): 521-538, Sartorio argues that causes can 
be disjunctive.  8	  Roberta Ballarin “Disjunctive Effects and the Logic of Causation” (2014) British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 65, pp. 21–38. 
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 On to a solution. The best diagnosis of the case is that it is afflicted by causal 
indeterminacy. Jane is determinately responsible for a death, but it is indeterminate which 
death she caused. Indeterminacy avoids problems with disjunctive causes and with the 
denial of the additivity of causation, while providing an elegant and intuitive diagnosis of 
the case.9 
 Indeterminacy comes in several varieties, including semantic indeterminacy, 
epistemic indeterminacy, and metaphysical indeterminacy. Causal indeterminacy in this 
case is of the latter sort, for the following reasons. Semantic indeterminacy involves 
indeterminacy in a concept or expression rather than in reality, and is exemplified in 
vague terms like “cloud” that apply imperfectly to fully determinate reality. But the 
battlefield case does not involve ambiguity in the concept or expression of the term 
“cause”. Precisification of the term “cause” is of no help in this case, for there is not an 
underlying range of different causal relations to each soldier’s death available to ground 
further precisifications of the term. Nor is epistemic indeterminacy the salient sort. 
Epistemic indeterminacy involves epistemic uncertainty about facts of the matter. But 
even an ideal epistemic situation would not help determine exactly what Jane caused. 
There is no fact of the matter hidden from human evaluation and expression; there is no 
uniquely human limit that frustrates attempts at knowing the truth. In contrast, 
metaphysical indeterminacy is perfectly suited to the task of accounting for Battlefield. 
Battlefield involves indeterminacy “in the world” rather than in thoughts, concepts, 
expressions, or epistemic situations.  
 Now, the existence and nature of metaphysical indeterminacy is a source of great 
controversy. Following Barnes and Williams, I take metaphysical indeterminacy to 
involve multiple complete precisifications of reality.10 In more detail: assuming a 
framework of possible worlds (where possible worlds are maximal ways things can be), 
the hallmark of Barnes/ Williams indeterminacy is multiple actualities. That there are 
multiple distinct actualities means there is at least one actual world at which e occurs and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Eric Swanson (Indeterminacy in Causation, forthcoming, Philosophical Quarterly) independently argues 
for causal indeterminacy in these cases on different grounds having to do with the logical structure of 
causal claims. 10	  Barnes, Elizabeth and J. R. G. Williams “A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy” (2011) In Karen 
Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman, editors, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics volume 6, 103–148. Oxford 
University Press. 
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at least one actual world at which e does not occur. Battlefield is best represented by 
multiple actual worlds, each containing a distinct causal responsibility of Jane. Which 
one obtains is metaphysically unsettled. For example: there is a possible world in which 
Jane is causally responsible for Soldier 1’s death, a possible world in which Jane 
responds to Soldier 2’s death but not Soldier 1’s death, and so on.11  
 Though Battlefield seems to be an isolated, outré case, this type of metaphysical 
indeterminacy turns out to be ubiquitous. Consider the case of giving to charity, adapted 
from Unger’s Living High and Letting Die: 
 
 Charity: Giving $100 to the Oxfam Emergency Fund will save exactly one 
 human  life. You fail to give the $100.12 
 
Exactly whom did you fail to save? You did fail to save someone, since it is 
determinately true that giving $100 would have saved exactly one person. Given basic 
assumptions about the structure of the charity, there are no grounds for holding that you 
failed to save any particular person who would have received the money from the charity: 
there is no determined order about the flow of money to specific persons in need. And it 
is also implausible that you failed to save every person suffering from famine to whom 
the charity would have given money, since $100 would have only saved one person.13 
Rather, it is most plausible that it is indeterminate exactly which person you failed to 
save. 
 With a basic model and several examples of causal indeterminacy in hand, we can 
move on to more complex types of causal determinacy and indeterminacy. One 
interesting lesson from the Battlefield case and ones like it is that there can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Here I utilize Barnes and Williams’ account of metaphysical indeterminacy owing to its being an 
especially good fit for these purposes. Though other accounts of indeterminacy might fit the bill, some are 
not suitable for accounting for the cases under discussion. I do not use Wilson’s account developed in “A 
Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy” (2013) in Inquiry 56:4 359-85, for example, 
because the determinate/ determinable relationship does not apply to negative properties and events, which 
are those at stake in cases of causation by omission. I argue for this principle in my (2014) “Two Problems 
for Proportionality about Omissions”, Dialectica 68:3 429-441. 12 Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die. (1996) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 13	  Sartorio argues that the failure of additivity of causation rescues us from the causal result that we are 
each disproportionately responsible for entire famines. She writes: “When there is a failure of Additivity, 
the evils we cause individually don’t add up to a single collective evil for which we are also causally 
responsible.” (“Failures to Act and Failures of Additivity” 2005, p. 14) 
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determinacy in quantity of causal responsibility without determinacy in causal 
responsibility more generally. Intuitively, Jane caused a ¼ portion of the outcome, or 
exactly one soldier’s death out of four deaths that she could have prevented. Similarly, 
failing to give $100 to OxFam causes exactly one human death, but it is indeterminate 
which death. In both cases, it is indeterminate exactly which portion of the outcome the 
omission causes, but determinate that the omission caused a particular portion of the 
outcome. 
 But the topic quickly becomes more complex when the quantity of causal 
contribution differs between causal possibilities. Consider the following modified version 
of Battlefield:  
 
 Propane Truck: Jane is on the battlefield and sees that four of her soldiers are 
 about to be slaughtered by the enemy. Jane has one bullet left. Jane could either 
 shoot at one enemy soldier, thus saving one of her soldiers, or shoot a propane 
 truck that would take out two enemy soldiers, thus saving two of her own soldiers. 
 She does not take any action, so all of her soldiers die.  
 
Here, Jane could have saved either any one soldier or any two soldiers, but saves none. 
For what is she causally responsible?   
 Supposing that no particular action on Jane’s part would have been likelier than 
another, this case exhibits three kinds of metaphysical indeterminacy. First, there is 
indeterminacy with respect to what Jane causes, since she could have taken any number 
of actions but did not. But there is an additional kind of counterfactual indeterminacy 
regarding what action Jane would have taken, for since no omitted action was likelier 
than the other, no possible world containing the action omitted in the actual world is 
closer to actuality than any other. Supposing that each effect that Jane might have caused 
was equally likely, there are no grounds for holding that the world in which Jane shoots 
the propane tank is closer than the world in which she shoots an enemy soldier. Not all 
cases of causal indeterminacy involve counterfactual indeterminacy: in a variant on the 
case in which Jane is more likely to shoot the propane tank than the enemy soldier, it is 
determinate that the world in which Jane shoots the tank is closest to actuality. Ties for 
closeness generate counterfactual indeterminacy: scenarios in which multiple, equally 
close worlds can each lay claim to representing reality accurately. 
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 Propane Truck also exhibits what might appropriately be called quantitative 
indeterminacy, or indeterminacy in the amount of causal responsibility borne by a cause 
to an outcome. For since it is indeterminate which action Jane would have taken had she 
done something, it is thereby indeterminate which quantity of the outcome she caused. If 
she had shot the propane truck, she would have saved two soldiers. If she had shot an 
enemy soldier, she would have saved one soldier. Due to her failure to take action, Jane 
clearly caused some portion of the outcome, but there are no grounds for holding that she 
caused one soldier’s death rather than two soldiers’ deaths.14 Quantitative indeterminacy 
is closely related to counterfactual indeterminacy, since the former involves multiple 
equally close possibilities containing quantitatively different causal contributions.15 
Quantitative indeterminacy renders a case like Propane Truck doubly indeterminate: not 
only is it not precise what Jane is responsible for, but it is also not precise how much of 
the outcome she caused. 
 So far I have focused on cases in which there are several equally plausible 
candidates that can lay claim to being the outcome, leading to metaphysical 
indeterminacy with respect to which effect is caused. But the lessons drawn apply mutatis 
mutandis to causes as well. Consider: 
  
 Life-Saving Button: Any one of fifty doctors can press a button that will result in 
 delivering life-saving medication to a patient. No doctor presses the button, and 
 the patient dies. 
 
This case shares the structure of the previous cases, except that indeterminacy afflicts the 
cause rather than the effect. It is incorrect that no doctor caused the patient’s death, since 
for each of them, pressing the button would have saved the patient. It is incorrect to hold 
that every doctor caused the entirety of the patient’s death, since all of them at once could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  There is also a case to be made that it is indeterminate exactly what Jane’s omission is, for in failing to 
take action, she either omitted to save one soldier or omitted to save two soldiers. But, since she could not 
take both actions, it would be incorrect to say that she both failed to save one soldier and failed to save two 
soldiers. 15	  Here I follow Stalnaker rather than Lewis in holding that ties for closeness result in indeterminacy rather 
than straight-up falsity. Swanson (forthcoming) also discusses this point. For more on the original debate, 
see Stalnaker  (1968) “A Theory of Conditionals” in: Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, 
eds. William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, and also Lewis’ (1973) 
Counterfactuals Malden, MA: Basil Blackwell Ltd. 
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not have saved the patient. And there are no grounds for holding one particular doctor 
causally responsible over the others. The best diagnosis of the case is that it is 
metaphysically indeterminate who caused the patient’s death.  
 And another case: 
 
 Zombie Apocalypse: Furniture must be placed in front of a door or else 
 zombies will break into the building and kill the apocalypse survivors. The 
 furniture is too heavy for any individual to lift; two people are required to lift it, 
 and only two people can lift it. Six people refrain from lifting the furniture, 
 resulting in the death of the survivors.  
 
Which pair of people is causally responsible for the deaths? As usual, there are several 
indefensible answers. One cannot hold that all pairs are causally responsible for the 
deaths, for multiple reasons. First, such a view would result in causal overdetermination, 
since any particular person would belong to multiple pairs. Second, only one pair of 
people can lift the furniture. It is implausible to hold any particular pair responsible, since 
there are no grounds for selecting one pair over another. Rather, the best diagnosis of the 
case is that it is metaphysically indeterminate which pair caused the zombie break-in. 
 There are also cases that exhibit indeterminacy of both causes and effects. 
Consider the following modification of Unger’s charity case: 
  
 Collective Failure to Give: If any one person gives $100 to the OxFam 
 Emergency Fund, one life will be saved. No one gives.  
 
In this case, it is metaphysically indeterminate who causes the failure of the life to be 
saved, and additionally indeterminate exactly which life is not saved. For both the cause 
and the effect, there are multiple complete precisifications of both causal relata: multiple 
actualities containing distinct failures to give, and multiple actualities containing distinct 
lives that are not saved.  
 Holding agents determinately morally responsible for what they cause requires 
determinacy in the causal relation. These cases suggest that the type of moral 
responsibility tied to causation is similarly afflicted with indeterminacy. If it is 
metaphysically indeterminate what Jane causes in the Battlefield case, then the moral 
attribution in the case is also indeterminate.  
 There are a variety of objections to be made based on the relationship between 
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causation and moral responsibility; space forbids me from addressing all of them. Here I 
will address several major ones. 
 One objection holds that moral responsibility is to be divorced from moral 
blameworthiness. Moral blameworthiness can be attributed to Jane based on what she 
failed to do. This objector asks: why not view the case differently and hold Jane morally 
responsible for failing to take action rather than bite the bullet on indeterminacy about 
effects? 
 Several reasons. First, retaining a link between actual causation and moral 
responsibility is important for moral theory more generally. Holding Jane morally 
responsible for failing to take action is only part of the causal story. For if she had failed 
to take action in a different scenario (for example, a scenario in which the enemy soldiers 
were equipped with rubber bands, rather than guns), her omission would not have 
resulted in serious consequences. It is the results—the deaths of the soldiers—that are 
morally important to the case. Heeding results in addition to actions respects the practical 
and legal implications of denying responsibility for the soldiers’ deaths. Families of the 
deceased soldiers testifying in court against Jane do not care only that she failed to act; 
they care that her failure to act resulted in at least one death that could have been 
prevented. Attributing moral blameworthiness to the omission apart from its result leaves 
out a large swath of morally important information. Second: it is methodologically 
important to treat complex omissive causation as much like “normal” causation as 
possible. Suppose that, in a variant on Battlefield, there is only one enemy soldier that 
Jane fails to shoot, and only one allied soldier to save. Here, the picture of moral 
culpability is simple and straightforward: Jane is morally at fault for failing to save her 
one allied soldier. Scaling the case up should not result in radically different treatment: 
the complexity of Battlefield is no reason to retreat into a different sort of moral 
diagnosis of the case involving only the omitted action.  
 One might also hold that accepting causal indeterminacy of the sort described is 
simply too high a theoretical cost, given that important dependent concepts like moral 
and legal responsibility depend on causal responsibility. This objection holds that 
indeterminacy should be seen as a last resort, but not considered a diagnostic solution to 
cases like Battlefield. 
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 I respond: comparable alternatives to accepting causal indeterminacy are equally, 
if not more, undesirable than indeterminacy. Holding agents responsible for more deaths 
than they could have prevented would be a reductio of a theory that posits such a 
solution. Agents should not be absolved of responsibility entirely simply because the 
situations are complex. And it is implausible to divorce moral responsibility from 
causation entirely, since responsibility should at least partly depend on actual outcomes. 
 
3. Semantic Indeterminacy in the Causal Concept 
One assumption of the previous examples is that there can be quantitative differences in 
causal contributions. Both causes and effects can be divided: causal contributions to 
outcomes can quantitatively differ, and outcomes can be divided according to causal 
contributions.16 I also discussed a type of quantitative indeterminacy, or indeterminacy 
with respect to quantitative causal contributions to outcomes, having to do with 
counterfactual indeterminacy, or indeterminacy generated by equally likely causal 
scenarios. In this section I present a new kind of quantitative causal indeterminacy, and 
argue that it leads to indeterminacy in quantitative moral judgments. 
 Consider the following pair of cases:17  
  
 Overdetermining Assassins: Suzy and Billy are each dispatched to kill Victim. 
 Suzy and Billy each shoot Victim at the same time; each bullet enters Victim’s 
 heart at the same time; Victim dies. 
 
 Unwitting Teamwork Assassins: Suzy and Billy are each dispatched to kill 
 Victim. Suzy and Billy each shoot Victim at the same time. Unbeknownst to both 
 assassins, Victim is particularly strong and requires two bullets for his demise.  
 
Overdetermining Assassins is a case of causal overdetermination, a scenario in which 
multiple causes are individually sufficient to bring about an outcome. Unwitting 
Teamwork Assassins is a case of joint causation, a scenario in which multiple causes are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  I argue that causation comes in degrees in Bernstein, Causal Proportions and Moral Responsibility 
(committed to Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, ed. David Shoemaker, 2017). See also 
Matthew Braham & Martin van Hees’ “Degrees of Causation” (2009) Erkenntnis 71 (3): 323-344. 17	  This pair of cases is presented and explored extensively in Bernstein, Causal Proportions and Moral 
Responsibility but there they are used to argue that the lack of independent criterion for deploying different 
causal concepts is a barrier to a more general theory of the relationship between causation and moral 
responsibility.  
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necessary to bring about an outcome. What kind of moral difference between the cases 
stems from the causal difference? That is, how does each assassin’s portion of moral 
responsibility in Overdetermining Assassins differ from that of each assassin’s portion of 
moral responsibility in Unwitting Teamwork Assassins? 
 Answering this question requires answering a prior question: are the assassins in 
Overdetermining Assassins more or less causally responsible than the assassins in 
Unwitting Teamwork Assassins? As I will now show, which answer is correct crucially 
depends on what type of causal concept one employs. 
 One line of thought holds that each assassin in Overdetermining Assassins is more 
causally responsible than each assassin in Unwitting Teamwork Assassins. For each 
overdetermining assassin is individually responsible for bringing about the entire 
outcome: had one assassin not shot, the other assassin would have been entirely sufficient 
to bring about Victim’s death. But this suggestion is specifically based on the application 
of a “productive” or “energy transfer” causal concept in comparing these cases. 
According to the energy transfer theory of causation, c is a cause of e if c transfers energy 
to e. The assassins who each transfer a portion of energy sufficient to bring about 
Victim’s death are more causally responsible than the assassins who each transfer half the 
portion of energy required to bring about Victim’s death. 
 But the quantitative comparison of the cases differs when a different causal 
concept is utilized. Consider the “dependent” causal concept, according to which c is a 
cause of e if, roughly, had c not occurred, e would not have occurred. Invoking a 
dependent causal concept changes the quantitative causal contributions in each case. For 
each assassin in Unwitting Teamwork Assassin is more important to the occurrence of 
Victim’s death given that if one of them had failed to shoot, Victim would not have died. 
Each assassin in Overdetermining Assassins, in contrast, is individually inessential to the 
outcome’s occurrence. 
 Cases that call for evaluation of quantitatively different causal contributions are 
afflicted with semantic indeterminacy involving which causal concept is employed. 
Different causal concepts yield different quantitative results. Why semantic 
indeterminacy? Because the causal quantities in question are perfectly determinate when 
cashed out in terms of each causal concept. It would be possible, in theory, to measure 
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exactly how much energy each bullet transfers to Victim. And it is determinately true or 
false that if had one assassin not fired, Victim would not have died. Unlike the cases in 
the first section, the world is perfectly determinate with respect to quantities of causal 
contribution in these cases. It is our thought and language that are imprecise. If human 
thought and language were more nuanced, then causal claims would specify whether 
productive or dependent causation were the types in play. For example, “Billy’s gunshot 
causally contributed to Victim’s death” would have several further precisifications 
involving productive or dependent types of causation. But as it stands, there are two 
completely precise causal quantities, and our language shifts between them. 
 Semantic indeterminacy in causal judgments has broad implications in moral 
evaluation and the causal facts relevant for legal decisions. For if the relationship 
between causation and moral responsibility is proportionate, then it is indeterminate how 
to comparatively evaluate the assassins’ actions given conflicting causal data. Legal 
theory, too, is influenced by semantic indeterminacy of causal claims. Though the 
counterfactual account of causation is the gold standard in legal theorizing, its application 
is uneven, and legal decisions often switch between counterfactual accounts of causation 
and productive theories of causation on an ad hoc basis. This trouble with causation was 
recently on display in the 2014 Supreme Court case United States vs. Burrage, in which a 
drug dealer sold a portion of drugs sufficient to kill a victim. But an autopsy performed 
on the victim’s body showed the presence of another portion of drugs also sufficient to 
kill him. Given that the drug dealer’s causal contribution to the death did not pass the 
counterfactual test for causation, his lawyers appealed the case to the Supreme Court 
(which ultimately acquitted him), with the competing side arguing that the counterfactual 
test was inadequate for judging that the drug dealer was a key causal contributor to the 
outcome.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Causation is often thought to be an example of a perfectly precise metaphysical relation, 
immune from the vagueness and indeterminacy that afflict other metaphysical tools. I 
have suggested that there are at least two types of indeterminacy in the causal relation. 
Metaphysical indeterminacy is prevalent in certain cases involving causation by 
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omission, in which there are often multiple causal possibilities that can equally lay claim 
to being a cause or an effect. The other type of indeterminacy, quantitative 
indeterminacy, stems from imprecision in the way our causal concept is deployed in 
judgments of differing quantitative causal contributions to outcomes. Both sorts of 
indeterminacy impact the type of moral responsibility that stems from causal 
responsibility; in particular, they effect the precision and exactness with which moral 
blameworthiness can be attributed.18 
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